A commonplace of some communist and pro-communist propaganda, and more generally some currents of anti-Italian vulgate journalism, is accused of "war crimes" the work of the Italian Army in Yugoslavia during World War II.
Those who spread such rumors are frequently motivated by a twofold ideological intent. The first course is to denigrate and demean Italian history, as has been systematically left in the historiography of the past 60 years. The second is instead to justify and legitimize the invasion of Italian territory, genocide and ethnic cleansing carried out by Tito, amputation from the mother country in the region of Venezia Giulia.
would be easy to answer these accusations by pointing out how the Slavs from the time of their invasion of the Balkans in the seventh century AD C., have carried out a genocide of the local Latin population, and have gradually spread to Latin and Italian territories of Venezia Giulia and Dalmatia, later with the support of the secular enemy of Italy, the house of Habsburg, who was pursuing a policy blatantly pro-Slavic and anti-Italian. We should remember the killings and violence against Italians continue for centuries, the draft of Franz Joseph and Germanize slavicized Alto Adige, Venezia Giulia and Dalmatia, [1] the expulsion of tens and tens of thousands of Italians from Trieste and Istria to top Twentieth century, [2] imprisonment in the Austrian camp of over 100,000 Italian civilians Austrian subjects, [3] violation of their civil and political rights under colonial rule Habsburg [4] government and inciting to the Slavs to persecute the Italians, they were envious of the greater economic, social and cultural. Already
only this would in itself be sufficient to respond to certain allegations pretestuosse, showing that in fact for 1300 years, the Italians were persecuted by the invading Slavs, only arrived in the Balkans in the seventh century asiatiche.Tuttavia directly from the steppes, it is fully possible to answer attacks against l’operato dell’Esercito italiano in Jugoslavia nel 1941-1943, mostrando come esso sia stato fondamentalmente corretto, ed anzi sotto un certo aspetto esemplare.
1. LA JUGOSLAVIA DECIDE NEL 1941 DI ENTRARE IN GUERRA CONTRO L’ITALIA
2. L’ATTACCO DELLA GUERRIGLIA CONTRO IL REGIO ESERCITO ED I CRIMINI DI GUERRA DEI PARTIGIANI SLAVI
3. L’OPERATO ANTI-GUERRIGLIA DELL’ESERCITO ITALIANO
4. LA DIFESA DELLE POPOLAZIONI CIVILI DALL’AZIONE DEI PARTIGIANI
5. IL GIUDIZIO DEGLI SLOVENI SULL’OCCUPAZIONE ITALIANA. DUE VISIONI OPPOSTE
6. BIBLIOGRAFIA
7. CONCLUSIONE
1. LA JUGOSLAVIA DECIDE NEL 1941 DI ENTRARE IN GUERRA CONTRO ITALY
In honor of the historical truth, it should immediately recall how was not Italy declared war on Yugoslavia and to attack, but the opposite.
Although Yugoslavia was the main architect of the missing Italian territorial claims after the First World War, had made an ethnic cleansing of Italians in Dalmatia and had fomented terrorism in Venezia Giulia, Rome's government tried to establish a diplomatic link cooperation and friendship with the government in Belgrade with the help of the Minister Stojadinovic, in 1937 was signed by the two governments even a non-aggression pact, a true friendship treaty with Italy undertook to respect the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.
As a result of diplomatic negotiations, Yugoslavia, March 25, 1941, completed the number of nations participating in the Balkan Pact Trpartito becoming a de facto ally of the Axis. No formal request was made by the Axis in Yugoslavia, but Yugoslavia had secret conversations go to war against Greece, in support of Italy, getting in return the coveted outlet to the Aegean Sea with the annexation of the port of Thessaloniki. Promptly the British government was able to organize the day after a coup led by Air Force chief, General Simovic. The regent Paul was sent into exile, the head of governo arrestato, Pietro (il re fanciullo come definito da Londra) saliva al trono.Churchill il 27 marzo in un discorso proclamava: L’Impero Britannico ed i suoi alleati faranno causa comune con la nazione jugoslava. Noi continueremo a marciare e faremo in comune tutti gli sforzi fino al raggiungimento della vitoria.”
Fra UK e Jugoslavia si stringeva un patto politico e militare, il che equivaleva a dire che la Jugoslavia entrava ufficialmente in guerra contro le potenze dell’ “Asse”, mentre al contempo mobilitava l’esercito. Alla Jugoslavia gli inglesi offrirono subito un premio per la sua entrata in guerra al loro fianco, sarà l’Istria, Fiume e Zara.
Oltre ad aver infranto l’alleanza signed with the Axis, and to be factual and legal entry into the war against Germany and Italy through its political and military alliance with the United Kingdom, Yugoslavia itself opened hostilities by attacking first in Zadar (a city that belonged to Italy since the end of World War I, since the fighting began March 28, the day after the coup in Belgrade, the Yugoslav attack the forces of General Emilio Giglioli) and in northern Albania, in which Italian troops were stationed.
The Italo-Yugoslav war was therefore caused by Yugoslavia, which:
-broken friendship treaty exists independently with Italy, following a coup orchestrated by London-
signed a treaty of political and military alliance with the United Kingdom, at war with Italy and Germany, and in doing so in fact and in law in declaring war on Rome and Berlin-
attacked first, on Zara
The conflict in Albania and Italy and Yugoslavia, with the defeat of Yugoslavia and the invasion of its territory, it was simply a consequence of the aggression Yugoslav Italy. remains the undeniable fact that Yugoslavia was to go to war to Italy (and Germany), in alliance with England and in exchange for his cooperation, the promise of Italian territories .
2. GUERRILLA ATTACK AGAINST THE ROYAL ARMY AND WAR CRIMES OF Slavic partisans
2.1 The initial good reception of the Italian troops and the beginning of the insurgency by communist
As you know, having entered the war on Yugoslavia against Italy and Germany, the conflict resulted in the rapid defeat of the Slavic state, due to causes not only military but also political. In fact, it was based entirely on ethnic Serb dominance over all others, so as to have become the official name of "Kingdom of Serbs". At the time of military conflict fought effectively only the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and deserted in massa e non opposero alcuna resistenza agli Italo-Tedeschi.
Inizialmente, i rapporti fra governo italiano e Sloveni furono decisamente positivi, ed assolutamente non ostili. Mussolini decise di organizzare la Slovenia occidentale, sotto amministrazione italiana, in una provincia autonoma, unica in tutta Italia, unita sì al resto dello Stato, ma appunto provvista di ampia autonomia e forme di auto-governo.
Si manifestò da subito il fenomeno politico e culturale detto del “belogardismo”, con ciò intendendo l’alleanza filo-italiana degli Sloveni anti-comunisti, contraddistinta da una mentalità cattolica e conservatrice, sviluppati nella provincia autonoma di Lubiana fra il 1941 e il 1943 e tale da rappresentare for the entire period of the Italian presence is a huge phenomenon quantitatively.
Among those who adhered to the "belogardismo" may indicate the former Prime Minister of Slovenia, Marko Natlacen, together with two other former ministers, the mayor of Ljubljana Ivo Adlesic, the rector of the University of Ljubljana, Slavic, 105 Slovenian mayors, but the real leader of this movement was the archbishop of Ljubljana Gregorij Rozman, still popular among Slovenes.
conservatism and Catholicism, both the prevailing political culture in Slovenia at that time, joined to hostility toward the Serbs, who had imposed their hegemony in the kingdom of Yugoslavia, Italian fascist government in obtaining the consent of most of the Slovenian population.
2.2. The start of the partisan as a result of the German attack the USSR. War crimes of the partisans
a situation almost completely quiet in the Italian territories, followed, after June 21, 1941, the beginning of the communist partisans. The international communist movement had been pro-Nazi since the time of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, facilitated in every way the work of Hitler, following the precise instructions of Stalin. All this changed abruptly with the outbreak of war between Germany and USSR, so also in Slovenia and Dalmatia appeared communist guerrillas. Oliva explains the fact that "the troops [Italian] have moved in reaction to these attacks and, in turn, have not been determined by the hardness of employment, but from domestic and international factors independent of the behavior of the Royal army "[Gianni Oliva," It kills too little ", Milano 2006, p. 135] How was Yugoslavia to attack Italy in 1941, just after the Communist partisans were the first to attack Italian troops in Slovenia and Dalmatia.
Also, right now, the partisans were responsible for repeated and serious violations of the laws of war. Giorgio Rochat, certainly the most historic military after Italian Piero Pieri, and more competent with regard to the Second World War, focused also on the Balkan war of Italy in his monograph "The Italian Wars 1935-1943. To defeat the Empire of Ethiopia "(Turin 2005). First, the
Rochat provides a framework within which the Italian troops, which is classic of a regular army units opposed to irregular
"The first thing to note is that all regular armies have difficulties in understanding and addressing a partisan war. The institu-tion as a legitimate military monopoly of organized violence-ta al servizio dello Stato, quindi ricerca la massima potenza di­struttiva consentita dallo sviluppo degli armamenti per un con­flitto programmato contro forze analoghe degli Stati nemici. I suoi codici di valore sono orientati a questo tipo di conflitto, definirlo «cavalleresco» sarebbe eccessivo, ma tutti gli eserciti regolari ac­cettano alcune regole di massima come il rispetto del nemico feri­to o che si dà prigioniero (non fosse che per ovvie esigenze di re­ciprocità) e dei civili, fino a quando restano civili, ossia non par­tecipano ai combattimenti. […] La cultura e l'addestramento di un esercito regolare vanno però in crisi quando si trova a occupare a hostile country with a resistance of the people, where every civilian is a potential enemy, and is faced with a guerrilla war conducted according to rules that tactical and codes of conduct different from 'regular'. [...] So it tends to resort to brutal solu-tions (executions, destruction of villages, deportations) "[Ibid, p. 366]
In other words, Rochat recalls how the Royal Army found itself having to face opponents who did not respect the laws of war: the systematic killing of prisoners, torture, terrorist attacks etc..
To give an idea of \u200b\u200bhow to conduct the war, very few are enough quotations from the olive, for some episodes of war: "Tens and tens of mi-litari Italians were left with broken limbs, castrated, their eyes enucleated [...] When our troops were able to return to the scene of the fight, they were able to see that the wounded were sevi-financed: all stripped naked, some castrated, the collar beams embedded in the eye, then slaughtered all [...] 1 rebels attacked furiously on the wounded, the worst they opened the abdomen by removing the viscera-there, the lighter the head smashed hammer and then threw the bodies into a well eighty feet deep. "[Gianni Oliva," It kills too little, "Milan 2006,], so-called “partigiani” secondo le leggi di guerra dell’epoca non potevano “ essere considerati legittimi belligeranti, ma franchi tiratori e come tali tratta­ti” Ciò avveniva per una serie precisa di ragioni: “1 ) non avevano possesso stabile di territorio, né erano insorti contro di noi al momento del­l'occupazione della Jugoslavia; 2) non facevano capo ad un governo responsabile né, per motto tempo, apparten­nero ad un'organizzazione unica; 3) erano sudditii di uno Stato che aveva concluso con noi un armistizio; 4) non portavano uniformi né, spesso, distintivo visibile a di­stanza; 5) non sempre portavano le armi apertamente; 6) non sempre respect the laws and customs of war; 7) for a long time were not recognized as legitimate refrigerants beautiful-even by the United Nations, who knew that qualification instead to re-Chetniks. " [Note of the Italian General Staff, quoted in Oliva, cit., P. 110]
Certain forms of conduct of the war carried out by the "partisan" as the attacks on treason, the bombings, killings of prisoners, the torture inflicted on them etc.. were and still are, contrary to the laws of war. The characters of the counter-insurgency and then the Italian armed forces were a reaction to the criminal actions of partisans, made contrary to the laws of war.
Italian anti-guerrilla operations were therefore a result of the attack is made against the Royal Army by Communist partisans, and due to international factors, both independent of his work, both the partisans of war crimes.
3. The counter-insurgency operations ITALIAN ARMY
1. Roatta instructions. Classical rules of counter-insurgency, in accordance with the laws of war
The instructions given by Roat, commander of Italian troops in Yugoslavia, were simple and trivial the anti-guerrilla warfare. Quoting from the still Rochat:
"The long circular issued on 1 March 1942 by General Roat-ta [...] Is a comprehensive collection of instructions for 1'occupazione and counter-insurgency, and a strong appeal to more fighting troops, the larger document that we know about these issues, it deserves some attention "[Ibid, p . 368]
The instructions are defined by Rochat as "elementary", being in the teaching of any school of war:
"assumes a very low level of training of troops and, above all, to the paintings (the particulars are elementary, the teaching in any school official) and tries to bring it rhymes with-god pages and pages of instructions. "[ibid, p. 368]
Roatta The rules included:
1) the execution of partisans
2) the use of reprisals on civilians
3) the destruction of homes of those who supported the partisans
4) internment of those who supported the partisans
5 ) had to avoid hitting churches, schools, hospitals, public works, and there was no need to resort to indiscriminate bombing of villages
Rochat Comment on: "They are the classic rules dell'antiguerriglia, applied in all the wars simultaneously, with obvious variations and some restric-tion previous centuries. "[ibid, p. 369]. Of Gianni Oliva has the same opinion: "There has been a repressive policy of the Royal army, similar to that occupying armies of every nation (including democratic ones), implement in an enemy country [...] where you develop a guerrilla variously supported by civilian population "[Gianni Oliva," It kills too little ", Milano 2006, p. 8]
instructions provided Roatta fact what was contained in the anti-guerrilla armies of all the belligerents era, including the American one. addition, they were fully in compliance to the same laws of war then existing , which allowed the execution of irregular combatants, retaliation and internment of civilians guilty of union with irregular units.
As shown clearly, the guidelines of this general are not planning any systematic extermination of the civilian population, but they were only the purpose of suppressing guerrilla activity. The absence of a plan to kill or even expulsion of the inhabitants, as such, is also shown by the directives to save churches, schools, hospitals, public works, and not to use carpet bombing of villages.
2. The assessment of the level of hardness Rochat counter-insurgency operations
The Rochat has no doubt that the Italian troops acted in the conflict in a less harsh of all other contenders. First, they fought with lack of determination:
"All indications say that the Italian troops faced the war with little enthusiasm and participation, is an indirect testimony to the need to renew the command re-petutamente directives rigor" [Ibid , p. 370]
Above all, the Royal Army was, of all those involved in the Balkan war, certainly the less fierce, so that these excesses were the work of individual actions or individual departments, rather than the norm:
"RONMENT It should be noted that co- in a war with an extraordinary level of atrocities and massacres by both sides, the Italian troops was certainly less ferocious-Rono '. Even the hardest of the co-send orders placed restrictions on reprisals, such as respect for women and children. And the repression was carried out with a high rate of executions and devastation, massacres and brutality without com-Piute other belligerents, including Germany. Also note if the between-round Roat: "You know very well that over-reaction-tion, made in good faith, will never be prosecuted," should re-conduct the defense of comrades attacked, not for counterinsurgency operations, not Directives can be compared to Hitler-it endorsing a priori any excess or massacre committed by Nazi troops. there were certainly excesses, but initiatives for individual departments or smaller, not as a rule of conduct of operations . "[Ibid, pp. 370-371]
This view is presented by Gianni Oliva: "On the military side, there is certainly a substantial difference between the army and the Royal Werhmacht . For German strategy, systematic terror is the central tool of policy of occupation [...] The violence of the Royal army, by contrast, is a defensive reaction in the face of partisan attacks [...] The comparison with the brutality of German is therefore impossible, both quantitative and qualitative terms to "[" It kills too little ", Milano 2006, p. 7] A Oliva explains that as there had been a flight of German civilians from Slovenia to the Italian one, because the Italian occupation was milder than that of Germany [ibid, p. 124]
Besides, if some abuses occurred on one side by individual departments or children between combat troops (as happens in virtually every conflict), other units applied gently to the instructions received anti-insurgency, often refusing to perform orders.
3. The conduction Italian Field
As for the internment of civilians, they had the sole purpose of conducting away from the theater of war guilty of aiding members to the "partisan", as explained above, and is fully embedded in anti-OPERATIONS SHALL guerrillas. The instructions did not provide all the killing of these civilians, and deaths that occurred as a result of malnutrition or disease were not due to a preconceived plan, but due to neglect and administrative incapacity. This is a very frequent case, in fact quite common in the prison camps and the internment of the entire first half of the twentieth century.
Among the extensive documentation available, you can use for example allo studio di James Bacque “Gli altri lager”, edito da Mursia: ad esempio, il tasso di mortalità dei campi di prigionia francesi per Tedeschi nella seconda guerra mondiale fu quasi del 40%, non in conseguenza di un piano deliberato di sterminio, ma per negligenza, incuria, scarsità di fondi ecc.
Per fare un solo confronto, il tasso di mortalità medio dei lager austriaci per Italiani nella prima guerra mondiale fu del 25%, mentre nel caso del campo italiano di Arbe, decisamente il più alto fra tutti i campi italiani per Slavi, esso si aggirò sull’8,8% (1700 perdite circa, su di una popolazione calcolata dal Centro Wiesenthal nell’ordine circa 15.000 unità). Insomma, il tasso di mortalità average of the Austrian concentration camp for Italian prisoners in World War was three times the highest mortality rate recorded in the camps for Italians in Slovenia in World War II.
The Italian-led field was indeed much higher capacity than usual period, so that the majority of the total deaths due to living conditions in places of internment be found precisely in Rab (1700 on just over 2000): with few exceptions, almost all other areas intended for Italians Slavs were not victims of malnutrition or disease outside of those natural causes, an outstanding result for the period, much better than those of American prison camps, not that di quelli tedeschi o sovietici.
4. LA DIFESA DELLE POPOLAZIONI CIVILI DALL’AZIONE DEI PARTIGIANI
L'esercito italiano in Jugoslavia, oltre alle operazioni belliche contro i guerriglieri locali, costituì un valido strumento di protezione delle popolazioni locali dalle violenze dei “partigiani” titini e degli ustascia Croati.
Per rimanere solo alla Slovenia, la schiacciante maggioranza degli abitanti non era affatto filo-comunista, e risultava anzi vittima dell'operato dei partigiani comunisti stessi, che massacravano gli avversari politici e depredavano le popolazioni, non diversamente da quanto accadeva in Italia ad opera dei loro “compagni” della “Resistenza”. The Royal army represented a defense for civilians even before the partisans of Tito, whose work was extremely violent and oppressive, "Apart from the cops-tion of food and cattle in the civilian population was subject, those who were deemed beneficial to the busy- , re were treacherously murdered along with their fami-lies, whole villages were looted and burned, ex-works, mines, sawmills, farm equipment, schools and churches were burned or destroyed, men were forced to ar-roles in the bands, young women were kidnapped. " (Note of the Italian General Staff, quoted in Oliva, cit., P. 145). The activities of Italian defense of the civilian population from violence and exceeds the so-called "partisan" found the alliance of many Slavs who preferred to fight together against the Italians instead, enlisting in the "MVAC", "Anti-Communist militias." In Dalmatia
then prevailed a state of "bellum omnium contra omnes" (Ustasha, Chetniks, Communists), where you slaughtered each other: the Italian military presence often protected the civilian population, an easy target of the hostility of "guerrillas." The Germans accused the Italian allies of 'clear and continuous pro-ve of sympathy "towards the Serbs and the ve-Jews who protected nivano dalle persecuzioni degli ustascia e aiutati a trasferirsi coi loro beni nella zona italiana.
E’ importante al riguardo il lavoro dell'ebreo dàlmata Menachem Shelah: "Un debito di gratitudine Storia dei rapporti tra E.I. e gli ebrei in Dalmazia (1941 - 1943)". Il Menachem, originario della Dalmazia ed in seguito divenuto professore di storia contemporanea all’università di Gerusalemme, spiega come il Regio Esercito salvò una moltitudine di ebrei dàlmati (oltre 10.000), che altrimenti sarebbero stati massacrati dagli ustascia. Non soltanto gli Ebrei furono salvati dal Regio Esercito, ma anche un gran numero di Serbi, scampati alle stragi degli ustascia grazie alla protezione offerta dall’esercito italiano.
The defense of civilians against violence committed by Italian communists and Ustasha is a well known fact. This included even as the oil: "Italian troops intervened to quell the strife between local factions in conflict, and to put an obstacle to the violence of the Ustasha regular and irregular-ri that was raging against the Serbian Orthodox population and the Jews "[...] In Croatia, particu-larly, the direct action of our authorities to curb the violence of the Ustasha, and aroused a feeling of gratitude on the part of the Serb population, exacerbated the item and the Croatian government, influenced by Germans, who saw evil eye of the protection accorded by Italy to the Serbs and Chetniks "(Note of the Italian General Staff, quoted in Oliva, cit., pp. 110-111).
5. THE TRIAL OF ITALIAN SLOVENIAN EMPLOYMENT. Two opposite views
What is the opinion of Italian Slovenes employment? It is ambivalent and terminated in two opposing views together. The historical memory to more than 60 years after the Second World War still continues to divide the Slovenian nation, as well as others, including Italian.
Slovenia is born as an independent state in 1991, separating from Yugoslavia, including through a deep appreciation of its historical memories. The conception of its past 45 years proposed by the totalitarian communist state founded by Tito did not apply to the new republic of Slovenia, both for the differences in constitutional principles, both for its own offer itself as an autonomous state of Slovenes, instead of the Yugo-Slavs, the so-called "South Slavs".
This historical review has inevitably involved the Second World War and the civil war that has divided them among the Slovenes, among supporters of the USSR on the one hand, the other Axis allies.
in Slovenia are still facing today, two opposing historical memories. The first, represented by the left nostalgic for Tito, interprets what has happened in Slovenia in the period 1941 - 1945 as a so-called "war of liberation from foreign occupiers and with the resistance against the" collaboration "of" Bela Garda "(the" White Guard "Slovenian) and domobranci, supported by the Slovenian Church and an ally of the Italo-Tedeschi.
The other historical memory instead considers the events of the war as a civil war between Slovenes in which the main responsibility should be attributed to communism and his revolution. The Church and those who opposed Soviet communism would then be on the right side in their alliance with Italian and German. While nostalgic for Tito dwell on the work done by the Germans, Italians and Slovenians by their enemies, the supporters of belagardisti remember the massacres perpetrated by the partisans during the war and especially after. according to the current center-right Slovenian should be fully rehabilitated and re-evaluated all the fighters and anti-anti-Communist partisans, Axis allies (as, mutatis mutandis , the soldiers in Italy was allied with the Germans CSR) that should be granted all the rights and awards granted in the past to Tito. A law passed a few years since the Slovenian government is an expression of that view, acknowledging the status of combatants for the country of Slovenia to the "domobranci" and "belagardisti" allies of the Germans and Italians: it is as if Italian soldiers of the RSI had received the same official recognition of the partisans. Character
particularly dear to the "revisionist" Slovenia was the bishop of Ljubljana Rozman, top political supporter of the "White Guard" of Slovenia, supports the presence of German and Italian-made founder of straze Vaske (village guards), military units wire from which it sprang-fascist "Bela Garda." This prelate was convicted of "collaboration" by a court Tito, but now the right-wing parties and the Church itself Slovenia have requested, and finally obtained, which was officially restored through a retrial. The Judgement of
large part of the Slovenian population for the war of 1941-1945 is so favorable to belagardisti domobranci and the allies of the Italo-Tedeschi, rather than Tito.
The same attitude of public authorities, after the Communist dictatorship of Yugoslavia and the independence of Slovenia, is very different from the past about what during the communist rule, respectively, were defined as "collaboration" and "war of liberation."
Even in the field of Slovenian historians, no longer under the authority of the Communist regime, there was a thorough review of past history . E 'pioneering about the work of Bogdan Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954. The ethnic, political and Ideological Struggle , Chicago-London, 1970, translated into Italian with the title Trieste 1941-1954. The political struggle, ethnic and ideological , Milan, Murcia, 1973.Bogdan Novak is a Slovenian exile in the U.S., whose work that was published in 1970, also has the undoubted merit of at least 20 years ahead of the trend of the historiography Slovenia to reconsider the modalities and the nature of the regime Tito.La new availability of records, permitted by the establishment of a democratic regime in Slovenia after independence, and the very possibility of a "revision" of history, concessa dalla fine del sistema autoritario comunista, hanno condotto numerosi storici Sloveni a concordare ampiamente, sulla base della documentazione e delle testimonianze in lingua slovena, con molte valutazioni cui gli storici italiani erano pervenuti in precedenza, sulla base delle proprie fonti. Per un rapidissima sintesi sul “revisionismo storico” sloveno, cfr. Tone Ferenc, La storiografia sulla seconda guerra mondiale in Slovenia dopo il rivolgimento politico del 1990 , pp. 139-144; Milita Kacin, Appunti sull'attuale storiografia slovena , entrambi in "Storia contemporanea in Friuli", a. XXII, n. 23, 1992, pp. 147-157
Si può quindi rimarcare come sia nella coscienza della maggioranza dell'attuale popolazione slovena, sia degli storici sloveni stessi, il giudizio verso l'esercito italiano ed i suoi alleati locali sia tutt'altro che negativo. Tale atteggiamento di condanna si ritrova invece presso i nostalgici del comunismo.
6. BIBLIOGRAFIA
Si riporta qui un’elementare e ridottissima bibliografia, a cui naturalmente devono essere aggiunti l’Oliva ed il Rochat, precedentemente citati..
Sono utili per affrontare la tematica dei conflitti nell’area jugoslava in una prospettiva di ampio respiro le seguenti opere:
Katrin Boeck, “Von den Balkankrieg zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Kleinstantenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan”, München 1996
Béla Kiràly-Dimitrije Djordjevic, "East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars", New York 1987
On the origins of the war in Yugoslavia, cf. Andreas Hillgruber also the classic, "The military strategy of Hitler", foreword by R. de Felice, Milano 1986, pp. 513-521, 542-543
Specifically WWII Nazi invasion:
Dietrich Orlow, "The Nazis in the Balkans. A Case Study of totalitarian Politics ", 1968 Pittsburgh
Seckendorf Martin," Die Okkupationspolitik des deutschen Faschismus in Jugoslawien, Griechenland, Albanien, Ungarn und Italien (1941-1945), Berlin-Heidelberg 1992
regard to loss of life due to war together internal and external, which occurred in Yugoslavia in 1941-1945 (ie, excluding what Tito did after the war, with the "ethnic cleansing" in Carinthia, Vojvodina, and Dobruja Venezia Giulia and the gulag and the huge massacres which involved ex-combatants nationalist "bourgeois", church, etc.., which we discussed earlier), there is no precise figure, even if it is evaluated regularly above the one million deaths. Dusan
Breznik proposed 1,100,000 victims.
Paul Mayers and Arthur Campbell in "The population of Yugoslavia" (Washington 1954) speak of 1,067,000 victims
Bogoljub Kočević instead fallen
The work suggests 1,014,000 Vladimir Zerjavic "Jugoslavija-manipulacije zrtvama drugog svjetskog rata (Zagreb 1989) estimated a total of 1,027,000 Yugoslavs died.
The figure of over a million dead, very high in proportion to the population of Yugoslavia, Tito and further enhanced by the subsequent massacres of the conflict (not calculated by Zerjavic) was mainly due to the civil war between the peoples of the South Slavs. According to the U.S. Senate committee on war crimes in Yugoslavia during World War II, only the Serbs killed by Croats oscillate in a figure of between 300,000 and 500,000 (most likely closer to the possibility that the first second).
For comparison, the same Senate committee in 8111 indicates the Yugoslavs died due to military actions of the Italians. According to the Zerjavic, the number of Yugoslavs died at the hands of the Italians would be instead of about 15,000, so the 1, 5% of the total.
7. CONCLUSION
1) Italy not attacked Yugoslavia, but on the contrary it was attacked, having been the military regime in Belgrade to have signed an alliance formal political and military with the United Kingdom, becoming de jure and de facto at war with Italian and German states. The Italian occupation of the territories of Yugoslavia and the subsequent effects of the attack Yugoslav conflict are then to Italy.
2) Also, initially the relationship between Italians and Slovenes were relaxed. The origin of the outbreak of clashes stemmed from the communist guerrillas, independent of the Italian authorities and due to the war between Germany and USSR. Again, the same repressive operations of the Italian army was a direct consequence of the criminal (as marked by serious and willful violations of the laws of war) of Tito. Italian anti-guerrilla actions occurred as a result of and in response to the war crimes of the "partisan".
3) Moreover, the Italian military occupation of part of Yugoslavia consisted of normal counter-insurgency operations, carried out according to traditional criteria. They were less ferocious than those carried out by the other contenders in the Balkan conflict, and tried to spare the civilian population. The same Italian-run camps was quite good in relation to the period, and higher than that of those American POW camps.
Some excesses were the work of individuals or small units, which happens in every war, however, the instructions of Roat and the work of the great majority of the units were in accordance with the laws of war then in force.
4) The Italian army is also a good protection for the civilian population against the carnage and the violence perpetrated by "partisan" Tito and the Croatian Ustashi, incomparably higher than those of the Royal Army.
5) The majority of Slovenian population today is anti-titin and rather inclined to a positive view towards those who were once defined as "collaborators", allies of the Germans and Italians. The massacres and violence of "Tito" committed against the Slovenians outclass those of the Axis forces and their local allies.
[1] An objective assessment of the true nature of the Habsburg Empire, founded on the principle of ethnic hegemony of the element of Austria, may be made by recalling the decision of the imperial verbalization expressed in the Council of Ministers November 12, 1866, held under the presidency of the Emperor Franz Joseph. The minutes of the meeting reads: "His Majesty expressed the exact order you to act decisively against the influence of Italian elements still present in some regions of the Crown, and occupy appropriate places of public employees, courts, teachers as even with the influence of the press, operating in South Tyrol, Dalmatia, and on the coast for the Germanization of these territories and slavicized depending on the circumstances, with energy and without regard "The government decision, taken at the level from 'Emperor Francis Joseph and the his counsel, to proceed with the Germanization of the regions population and slavicized Italian, Alto Adige, Venezia Giulia and Dalmatia, "with energy and without any respect", states unequivocally the discriminatory and oppressive nature of the Hapsburg Empire against the Italian minority : Remember, however, that this is just one example among many of the anti-Italian policy in Austria. The policy of denationalization, hunted and real cleansing pursued by the Habsburgs to the detriment of the Italians (including the examples, many, should be recalled almost total extermination of Ladin in the lands invaded by so-called "South Tyrol" means Ladin, neo-Latin race there from the earliest inhabitant latinizzatosi antiquity and during the Roman period, were almost destroyed by the invasion of Austria, so that today it survives only a small minority in lands populated entirely by them in the past), then corresponded to that of the first royalist Yugoslavia, Tito then.
[2] This happened with the so-called "decrees Hohenhole", named after the Austrian governor of Venezia Giulia, Prince of Hohenhole, which issued them.
[3] in particular that of Notorious Katzenau, where thousands and thousands died of hunger, disease, starvation, Italians imprisoned there.
[4] Attilio Tamaro documented in "The conditions of Italian subjects of Austria in Venezia Giulia and Dalmatia "and Joseph Prague in" History of Dalmatia
